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PROTECTING CHARACTERS THROUGH COPYRIGHT
LAW: PAVING A NEW ROAD UPON WHICH LITERARY,




Most everyone would recognize Bugs Bunny, Charlie Brown, Ebenezer
Scrooge, and James Bond. These characters appear in a variety of mediums,
including cartoons, comic strips, novels, and motion pictures. Today, in the age
of sequels and retail advertising, characters have become an important com-
mercial commodity. Characters, thus, need legal protection. The federal copy-
right statute may provide this protection.
The federal copyright statute provides an author protection in his "original
work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression., 1 Thus, a fic-
tional character is protected by the copyright of the work in which the charac-
ter originally appears.2 Sometimes, however, a character can be removed from
the original work in which it appeared, then resurface in another completely
unrelated work. For example, a doll or figure resembling the cartoon character
Bugs Bunny can be created. Likewise, literary characters, such as Ebenezer
Scrooge, can be used in a modern movie-completely unrelated to Christmas.3
Thus, the questions arise: Does a doll resembling the Bugs Bunny cartoon
character infringe the copyright in the original cartoon series? Or, can the
Ebenezer Scrooge character be used in a modern movie completely unrelated
* © 1992 Dean D. Niro
** Attorney, Niro, Scavone, Hailer & Niro, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., DePaul University College
of Law, 1991; B.S. University of Colorado, 1988.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Professor Roberta Kwall for her helpful comments
and assistance on this paper. Many thanks to my father, Raymond Niro, for his helpful insight,
not only in the preparation of this Article, but throughout my life.
This Article began as a paper for Professor Roberta Kwall's Intellectual Property Seminar at
DePaul University College of Law. The paper then won the Willian Brinks Olds Hofer Gilson &
Lione Prize for the best student paper in the field of intellectual property.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
2. Id. §§ 101-914.
3. The Ebenezer Scrooge character appeared in Charles Dickens' story A Christmas Carol.
The story A Christmas Carol can no longer be protected by copyright because Charles Dickens
has been dead for over 50 years. The copyright in a work extends throughout the life of the author
and for a period of 50 years after the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302. Because Ebenezer Scrooge
is a well recognized character, for the purpose of this Article it will be presumed that the story A
Christmas Carol would today be entitled copyright protection.
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to Christmas without infringing the copyright in the original novel?' To an-
swer these questions, the heart and soul of characters must be analyzed.
A character is comprised of many elements: name, physical appearance, at-
tributes, mannerisms, speech and expression, habits, attire, setting, and lo-
cale.5 A character's interaction with others and general personality traits are
important elements of characterization. Characters very often come in a vari-
ety of forms. They may be human, animal, or some scientific creation.6 Char-
acters appear in novels, comic strips, and motion pictures. But, wherever a
character appears, it represents the individual creation of the author. That
said, some characters may represent only ideas of the author, while others may
enter the realm of copyrightable expression.
However characters are defined, literary, cartoon, and motion picture char-
acters often comprise the most important aspect of a particular work, even
when they are not an integral part of the plot.7 Indeed, the principal value of
many cartoons and stories rests more in the characters themselves than in the
plot.8 Therefore, authors have a significant interest in protecting their
characters.
As previously stated, copyright protection is afforded to all original works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 9 Therefore, characters
unquestionably qualify for copyright protection in certain limited
circumstances. 10
In this regard, courts are clear on one point: To be protected by copyright
apart from the story in which it originally appeared, a character must be more
than an idea in the public domain." In order to be protected by copyright, the
character must be a unique expression of the author's idea, capable of being
4. See infra p. 391 for a discussion of the copyright protectability of Ebenezer Scrooge.
5. Roger L. Zissu, Whither Character Rights: Some Observations-The Eleventh Donald C.
Bruce Memorial Lecture, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 121, 122 (1981).
6. Zissu stated:
Characters may originate in visual or non-visual form. Their visual appearance may
be in graphic or two-dimensional depictions such as cartoons, or in three-dimensional
representations, such as dolls or stage actors. The non-visual characters may derive
from verbal depictions in writings such as novels, short stories and plays ...
The characters may be human, animal or insect or even inanimate or invisible.
They may cross over to different forms, dimensions and media and even be spun off
from a lesser role in one television series to a leading role in another. Thus, visual
characters, if two-dimensional, may subsequently become three-dimensional as well as
literary characters and vice versa. For successful characters the value of character
rights in the media and merchandising fields may well run into millions.
Id.
7. E. Fulton Brylawski, Protection of Characters-Sam Spade Revisited, 22 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'Y 77, 78 (1974).
8. 1d.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
10. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.11.3, at 158 (1989). However, a party bringing an
infringement action must first register the work for which the author asserts his right. 3 MEL-
VILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01, at 13-5 (1990).
11. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (2d Cir. 1977).
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infringed (or copied)."3 The essence of the character-its physical appearance,
biological data, philosophical attitudes, and emotional dynamics manifested by
interpersonal relationships-must be developed by the author before he or she
can assert some form of property right in the character."3 Therefore, a highly
delineated character constitutes expression rather than a mere idea."
Unfortunately, courts have struggled to decide when literary, cartoon, and
motion picture characters are sufficiently delineated to be worthy of copyright
protection. The inconsistent results have left the law on the subject in disarray,
especially in the areas of literary, cartoon, and motion picture characters.
In determining protection of literary characters, the courts have applied a
very strict "story being told" test. This test provides literary characters copy-
right protection only if the plot of the story where the character appears fo-
cuses on the development and relationship of the character. 1 On the other
hand, courts have applied a less stringent "character delineation" test to deter-
mine the copyrightability of cartoon characters."6 Thus, a cartoon character is
protected by copyright if it is sufficiently delineated, while literary characters
are not protected unless the character development dominates the plot.' 7 To
add to the confusion, the courts, in determining the copyrightability of motion
picture characters, have applied both the "story being told" and "character
delineation" tests."8 Unfortunately, many courts are unsure which test is
proper.
This Article examines both the history of copyright protection for literary,
cartoon, and motion picture characters and the current state of the law. A
reasonable alternative to the current law is proposed-an alternative that will
decrease existing confusion about when a character may be protected by copy-
right. The same standard is proposed for literary, cartoon, and motion picture
characters. The proposed test uses a sliding scale approach that incorporates
elements of both the character delineation test and the story being told test.' 9
The analysis begins with the history of copyright protection provided to liter-
ary characters.
I. LITERARY CHARACTERS
Statutory copyright law protects "expression," not mere "ideas, '20 and a
12. James L. Turner, It's a Bird, It's a Plane or Is It Public Domain?: Analysis of Copyright
Protection Afforded Fictional Characters, 22 S. TEX. L.J. 341, 349 (1982).
13. Id.
14. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979).
15. Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
971 (1955).
16. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755.
17. Id.
18. Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
19. Id. at 1171; see also infra Section IV (clarifying the test for literary, graphic, and motion
picture characters).
20. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied. 327 U.S.
1992]
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literary character is "an intangible artistic creation that relies upon the
writer's words for any visible existence."21 Therefore, a literary character is
created and defined solely by the author, but comes to life in the mind of the
reader. Sometimes the reader may give literary characters a life of their own,
apart from the story or novel in which they first appeared.22 When this occurs,
the question arises whether the character may be afforded copyright protection
that is independent of the work itself. Judge Learned Hand paved the pathway
for affording copyright protection to literary characters, a pathway that has
become well travelled.
Judge Hand, in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.," suggested that liter-
ary characters may be protected "quite independently of the plot."24 In Nich-
ols, the author of the play Abie's Irish Rose alleged that Universal Pictures
Corp. had copied his work in a movie entitled The Cohens and The Kellys.'
Both works depict a struggle between an Irish Catholic family and a Jewish
family.28 In each, a child of the Catholic family secretly marries a child of the
Jewish family.27 When the children tell their parents of the marriage, the par-
ents become outraged and disown the newly married couple.28 In time, the
married couple has a child that both the Irish and the Jewish parents wish to
see. The disharmony ends when the Irish Catholic and the Jewish parents at-
tempt to secretly see their grandchild, unbeknownst to them, at the same
time.2 At the secret visit, the Irish Catholic and the Jewish grandparents dis-
790 (1946); Note, The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Characters Through Trade-
mark, Unfair Competition, and Copyright, 68 HARV. L. REV. 349, 356 (1954).
21. Turner, supra note 12, at 345.
22. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 2.7.2, at 127.
23. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1930).
24. Id. at 121; see I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at 2-175.
25. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120. Both works involve feuding Irish and Jewish fathers whose chil-
dren were in love, the marriage of the children, the birth of a grandchild, and a reconciliation.
Other than those similarities, the stories had little in common. See Leslie A. Kurtz, The Indepen-
dent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 429, 452 n.135.
26. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120.
27. Id. In Able's Irish Rose, the son was Jewish and the woman was Catholic. On the other
hand, in The Cohens and The Kellys. the son of an Irish Catholic family married the daughter of
a Jewish family:
"Abie's Irish Rose" presents a Jewish family living in prosperous circumstances in
New York. The father, a widower, is in business as a merchant, in which his son and
only child helps him. The boy has philandered with young women, who to his father's
great disgust have always been Gentiles, for he is obsessed with a passion that his
daughter-in-law shall be an orthodox Jewess ...
"The Cohens and The Kellys" presents two families, Jewish and Irish, living side
by side in the poorer quarters of New York in a state of perpetual enmity. The wives
in both cases are still living, and share in the mutual animosity, as do two small sons,
and even the respective dogs. The Jews have a daughter, the Irish a son; the Jewish
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cover each other and reconcile their differences.30 Each story differs in the
development of the characters and the final resolution. 1 Nevertheless, the con-
troversy arising from these two stories sets the stage for a significant develop-
ment in copyright law.
In Nichols, the court held that the defendant took no more than the law
permitted.32 However, in the opinion written by Judge Learned Hand, the
analysis was not limited to the literal text of the infringing work, because such
analysis would permit a plagiarist to escape infringement by making immate-
rial variations.3s The court held that the Irish Catholic and Jewish characters
were stock figures or "ideas," and to permit plaintiff copyright protection in
such characters would permit the plaintiff protection for that which was not
original."
Although in the Nichols opinion Judge Hand did not provide the characters
from Abie's Irish Rose with copyright protection, he paved the pathway for
doing so:
[W]e do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for
infringement .... Nor need we hold that the same may not be true as to
30. Id.
31. As Judge Learned Hand noted in his decision:
There are but four characters common to both plays, the lovers and the fathers.
The lovers are so faintly indicated as to be no more than stage properties. They are
loving and fertile; that is really all that can be said of them, and anyone else is quite
within his rights if he puts loving and fertile lovers in a play of his own, wherever he
gets the cue. The plaintiff's Jew is quite unlike the defendant's. His obsession is his
religion, on which depends such racial animosity as he has. He is affectionate, warm
and patriarchal. None of these fit the defendant's Jew, who shows affection for his
daughter only once, and who has none but the most superficial interest in his
grandchild. He is tricky, ostentatious and vulgar, only by misfortune redeemed into
honesty. Both are grotesque, extravagant and quarrelsome; both are fond of display;
but these common qualities make up only a small part of their simple pictures, no
more than any one might lift if he chose. The Irish fathers are even more unlike; the
plaintiff's a mere symbol for religious fanaticism and patriarchal pride, scarcely a
character at all. Neither quality appears in the defendant's, for while he goes to get
his grandchild, it is rather out of a truculent determination not to be forbidden, than
from pride in his progeny. For the rest he is only a grotesque hobbledehoy, used for
low comedy of the most conventional sort, which any one might borrow, if he chanced
not to know the exemplar.
Id. at 122.
32. Id. at 121.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 122. Judge Hand stated:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of ab-
stractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could
prevent the use of his "ideas," to which apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.
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the characters, quite independently of the "plot" proper, though, as far as
we know, such a case has never arisen. If Twelfth Night were copyrighted it
is quite possible that a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch
or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of his
characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the
household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mis-
tress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play, as
little capable of monopoly as Einstein's doctrine of Relativity or Darwin's
theory of the Origin of the Species. It follows that the less developed the
characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author
must bear for making them too indistinct."
Thus, Judge Hand proposed a test through which a character could be pro-
vided copyright protection apart from the story in which it originally appeared
if the character was well developed. Unfortunately, he failed to define what a
well developed character would be.
The test Judge Hand promulgated burdens the author with the task of de-
veloping the character distinctly within the writings.8 6 The gist of Judge
Hand's test is that a poorly developed character constitutes nothing more than
an "idea" not meriting copyright protection.87 Therefore, "the penalty for
painting a character too indistinctly is lack of protection for the copyrightable
component of the character, namely the characterization.""
The test proposed by Judge Hand in Nichols did not produce any hard and
fast rule as to how developed a character must be in order to be considered
copyrightable. The Ninth Circuit attempted to clarify the haze left by Nichols
in Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS.83 Unfortunately, the decision only increased
the existing haze, creating still more confusion.
In Warner Bros., the issue of copyrightability of a character in a novel was
squarely before the court.40 Dashiell Hammett published a novel entitled The
Maltese Falcon. The primary character of the novel was a detective named
Sam Spade. Dashiell Hammett granted Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc.
("Warner Brothers") the exclusive motion picture rights to The Maltese Fal-
con."' Subsequently, Hammett granted Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
("CBS") the rights to produce a radio show based on the series, entitled "The
Adventures of Sam Spade.""' The radio series included Sam Spade, as well as
other characters from The Maltese Falcon."' Warner Brothers sued CBS on
35. Id. at 121.
36. See Turner, supra note 12, at 346.
37. Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that poorly sketched char-
acters in the television program "The A Team" did not warrant protection).
38. Brylawski, supra note 7, at 86.
39. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955) (known as the "Sam
Spade Case").
40. Id. at 950.
41. Id. at 946-47.
42. Id. at 948.
43. Id.
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the grounds that the agreement with Hammett had conveyed to Warner
Brothers the exclusive rights to use the characters in The Maltese Falcon.
Hammett claimed that the contract with Warner Brothers did not contain an
express grant of the rights in the characters, and that it was the custom and
practice for an author to use his characters in sequels.4
4
After examining the facts, the court held that without an express grant of
rights to the characters in the contract with Warner Brothers, any rights to
characters of the original story were not transferred with the motion picture
rights to The Maltese Falcon.4'5 Thus, because the character rights were not
contained within the grant, Warner Brothers did not own the rights to the
characters."O
The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress did intend the copyright stat-
ute to include characters within the realm of protection.'7 The court held,
however, that the Sam Spade character was a mere vehicle for telling the
story and thus was not entitled to copyright protection. 4'8 In so holding, the
court suggested that a literary character could be protected by a copyright if
"[t]he character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is
only the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of
the protection afforded by the copyright.""' This test, known as the "story
being told" test, is inherently confusing.50 The Sam Spade standard would
lead to a result of excluding virtually all characters from copyright protection
because it "seems to envisage a 'story' devoid of plot wherein character study
constitutes all, or substantially all, of the work."5 1
Although some courts have accepted and applied the story being told test to
literary characters,"2 a good number have adopted a test more in line with the
character delineation test of Nichols.53 These courts have held that a literary
character can be protected by copyright when it acquires a distinctive person-
44. Id. at 948-49.
45. Id. at 949.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 950.
48. The decision was most likely prompted by the court's reluctance to deprive the author of
the right to make further use of his character. The court did not want to create a situation where
an author who sold rights to a story would also forfeit his rights to use his characters contained
within the story. The court simply wanted Dashiell Hammett to retain rights in the characters he
created.
49. Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950.
50. Kurtz, supra note 25, at 455.
51. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at 2-175.
52. Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (applying test to
Rocky motion picture characters); Warner Bros. v. Film Ventures Int'l, 403 F. Supp. 522 (C.D.
Cal. 1975) (applying the story being told test to movie characters).
53. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying the delineation test to literary characters); Filmvideo Re-
leasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying the delineation test to literary
characters), affd in part and rev'd in part, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981).
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ality.8" According to this line of reasoning, a character acquires a distinct per-
sonality when it has been delineated to such an extent that its behavior is
relatively predictable. 5 Therefore, under this theory, when such a character
encounters a new situation, it can be expected to act in a manner that is dis-
tinctive to that particular character and unsurprising."0
One case that provided a literary character copyright protection because it
was "sufficiently delineated" was Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings.7 In
Hastings, the plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action seeking permis-
sion to license, for television, twenty-three motion pictures concerning the
character Hopalong Cassidy. In 1912, Clarence Mulford wrote and published
a series of novels and short stories containing the Hopalong Cassidy character
based in the Old West. Mulford licensed the rights to make a movie based on
these books in 1935. Years later, the copyrights in the Hopalong Cassidy mo-
tion pictures expired while copyrights in the Hopalong Cassidy books were
renewed. Hastings thus concerned the copyrights in the books and not the
motion pictures. In the suit, the Southern District of New York found that the
Hopalong Cassidy character was continually developed throughout the series
of books. 58 The court ruled in favor of the owner of the copyrights in the
novels, recognizing the copyright protectability of literary characters. In so
holding, Judge Werker stated:
In my opinion, these [Hopalong Cassidy book] characters and others were
sufficiently delineated, developed and well-known to the public to be copy-
rightable. The use of these characters for the purpose intended by [the
plaintiff] therefore would constitute infringement with respect to the above
numbered films irrespective and independent of the similarity of the story
line.59
The court focused on the level of delineation of the Hopalong Cassidy charac-
ters.6 0 Interestingly, no mention was made of the story being told test.
This holding is peculiar because the character, Hopalong Cassidy, is strik-
ingly similar factually to Sam Spade in The Maltese Falcon. Cassidy is a
portrait of a typical cowboy from the Old West,61 while Sam Spade represents
54. See, e.g., DC Comics v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982); Detective Comics
v. Bruns Publications, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940); Burroughs, 519 F. Supp. at 391; Hastings,
509 F. Supp. 60; Detective Comics v. Fox Publications, 46 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Hill v.
Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
55. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 2.72, at 128.
56. 1 id.
57. 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981) (failing to deal with
copyrightability or similarity of characters).
58. Id. at 65.
59. Id. at 66.
60. Id. at 65-66. Nothing in the case indicated anything particularly distinctive about the char-
acters. The characters in the movie used the same names as those in the book, and both were
rough characters set in the Old West. Id.
61. The court in Hastings described the version of Hopalong Cassidy as "a diamond in the
rough" who was "quick tempered and given to cuss words": the typical cowboy. Id. at 65.
[Vol. 41:359
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the stereotypical detective." Both characters were highly delineated and ex-
tensively developed through a series of novels and short stories. The two deci-
sions conflict and can only be reconciled, if at all, on two bases. First, the two
cases were decided in two different circuits. 3 Second, in reading between the
lines of Warner Bros., it appears that a motivating factor in the court's deci-
sion was its desire to protect the author's rights in the characters he created.64
The Warner Bros. decision was most likely prompted by the court's reluctance
to deprive Dashiell Hammett of the right to make further use of the charac-
ters he created. 5 Other courts most likely recognized this distinction in
Warner Bros. and, without comment, simply adopted the character delineation
standard. Some courts have declined to accept the story being told test
promulgated in Warner Bros.,66 while others have suggested that this passage
is "arguably dicta."'67 In any event, it appears from the ruling in Hastings that
a literary character may be protected if the character is highly delineated,
regardless of whether the character.constitutes the story being told.
The confusion was compounded in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
62. See Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945, 946-50 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 971 (1955). The detective character Sam Spade has become the model upon which many
detective characters are based today. Many novels were written using Sam Spade as the detective.
The character was also used in a radio program. Id.
63. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, was decided in the Southern District of New York, which sits in
the Second Circuit. On the other hand, Warner Bros., 216 F.2d 945, was decided by the Ninth
Circuit. The Hastings court, but not the Warner Bros. court, would be compelled to follow Judge
Hand's proposition in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), discussed
supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
64. In Warner Bros., if the court had found that the Sam Spade character was protected by the
copyright in The Maltese Falcon, then Dashiell Hammett, the author, would not have been able
to use the Sam Spade character in future works. The court took a protectionist view toward the
author and fashioned its opinion accordingly. See Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 951.
65. Kurtz, supra note 25, at 454-55. Professor Kurtz further states, "The Sam Spade standard
would have the result of excluding virtually any character from copyright protection, because it
'seems to envisage a story devoid of plot wherein character study constitutes all, or substantially
all, of the work.'" Id. (quoting I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at 2-175). The court
did not want the author to lose his rights in his characters simply because he assigned the rights to
the story in which the characters appeared.
66. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.) (limiting the
Warner Bros. decision to word portraits, not graphic characters), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1978); CBS v. De Costa, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967) (hold-
ing that the Sam Spade case did not necessarily support the proposition that a character is not
copyrightable, because the court held only "that the contract of assignment did not convey the
exclusive right to use the character in the novel, and . . . the sequel . . . was not so similar as to
infringe the copyright"); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 301 (S.D:N.Y.
1977) (declining to follow the "Sam Spade Case" because it was not the law of the Second Cir-
cuit and for policy reasons); see also Goodis v. United Artist Television, 425 F.2d 397, 406 (2d
Cir. 1970) (holding that any conclusion that the characters from The Maltese Falcon are in the
public domain "would be clearly untenable from the standpoint of public policy").
67. Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that, regardless of whether




Inc.'8 Burroughs was an action for copyright infringement brought by the au-
thor of the original Tarzan novel, Tarzan of the Apes, against the maker of a
movie based on the characters in the novel.' The court held that the copyright
in the literary work covered the work as an entirety, including the charac-
ters."0 The court asserted:
It cannot be said that such a copyright contemplates protection of only the
plot, leaving the characters free for public exploitation for, as in the case of
plays, the "characters and sequence of incident [are] the substance" . . . .
However, it is only well-developed characters that are subject to copyright
protection."
The court held that the character Tarzan was delineated in a sufficiently dis-
tinctive fashion to be copyrightable and protected from infringement by the
copyright in the work itself.7 2 The court stated the following reasons in finding
sufficient delineation: "Tarzan is the ape man. He is an individual closely in
tune with the jungle environment, able to communicate with animals yet able
to experience human emotions, he is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle and
strong. He is Tarzan. . . . [Tihe character Tarzan is copyrightable . . . .
The court's description of Tarzan appears to enter into the realm of "idea"
rather than "expression." The description provided by the court is nothing
more than a simple collection of ideas for a stock character. The court did not
describe a well delineated character. The Tarzan character possesses many
qualities other than those described by the court. The character Tarzan, most
likely, is sufficiently delineated to afford copyright protection; however, the de-
lineation of the character extends beyond the simple reasons expressed by the
court in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.74 Courts have reasoned
that the character must be distinctly delineated in such a manner as to consti-
tute expression rather than idea in order to be subject to copyright protec-
tion.7 5 Tarzan acquires his delineation through his personality, through the
68. 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 683 F.2d 610 (2nd Cir. 1982). The plaintiff
commenced an action against defendants for copyright infringement arising from defendant
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.'s ("MGM's") 1981 remake of the film Tarzan, The Ape Man. Edgar
Rice Burroughs wrote the first Tarzan work in 1912. In 1931, MGM entered into an agreement
with Burroughs, under which MGM acquired the right to use the Tarzan character in an original
story created by MGM. In 1932, MGM released its first Tarzan movie. In 1977, the heirs of
Burroughs' estate terminated the renewal of the copyright in the Tarzan works. MGM did not
become aware of the termination until after work in the then-present Tarzan movie had begun. Id.
at 390.
69. The author entered into an agreement with MGM in 1932 that permitted MGM to use
Tarzan, along with other characters from the novel. Id. at 389-90.
70. Id. at 391.
71. Id. (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Tarzan's protectable features consist of his appearance and his personality. Both traits are
difficult to summarize in a short literary discussion.
75. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir.
1977).
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reader's expectation of his actions.
Under the Burroughs logic, too vast an area is covered by the copyright on
the generalized character. According to Burroughs, an author could infringe
the novel Tarzan of the Apes if he created any human creature that lived like
an animal in the jungle. The court itself had some difficulty expressing
Tarzan's extensive delineation.76 In any event, due to Tarzan's expressive de-
lineation, he was provided copyright protection.
The uncertainty of which test is applicable to literary characters desiring
copyright protection has led to problems. As of 1967, one commentator, Pro-
fessor Kaplan, noted that no case of infringement of a literary character inde-
pendent of plot, or the story being told, had occurred. 77 Yet, more recently,
decisions upholding copyrights in literary characters have generally involved
distinctive and fully delineated depictions, 78 while decisions denying copyright
status have involved sketchily drawn or stock characters. 7
In short, the test for the copyrightability of characters is unclear. Must the
character merely be clearly delineated or must the character be an integral
part of the plot? The Warner Bros. court may only have been saying that
stock characters are unprotectable if their interaction with new situations is
not both distinctive and predictable.8 What seems clear, however, is that
characters that are sufficiently delineated and that constitute a primary ele-
ment in a plot are fully protected by copyright laws.
II. CARTOON AND GRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS
Cartoons and other graphic representations of characters have been given
greater copyright protection than characters described by words.81 Protectable
76. See id.
77. See Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyrights: Proposals and Prospects, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 831, 839-40 (1967).
78. See Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (Superman char-
acter was highly delineated); Silverman v. CBS, 632 F. Supp. 1344, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Amos
& Andy characters protected by copyright), rev'd on other grounds, 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989);
Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Tarzan char-
acter protectable), af'd, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509
F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Hopalong Cassidy cowboy character was highly delineated).
79. See Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1988) (characters in television pilot
"Cargo" depicted only by three- or four-line summaries held not copyrightable); Warner Bros. v.
ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (Superman character not infringed by bumbling
superhero on television show "The Greatest American Hero"); Miller v. CBS, 209 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 502, 505 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (defendant's television show about convict-turned-lawyer did
not infringe plaintiff's book about a jailhouse lawyer); Warner Bros. v. Film Ventures Int'l, 403 F.
Supp. 522, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (Regan character from the movie The Exorcist not copyright-
able because the story was not subordinated to the character); Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 39 F.
Supp. 487, 490 (W.D.S.C. 1941) (the Lone Ranger from the "Lone Ranger" radio show held not
copyrightable), rev'd on other grounds, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942).
80. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 2.7.2, at 130.
81. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983); Silverman v. CBS, 632
F. Supp. 1344, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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elements of visually depicted characters differ in many respects from protect-
able elements in literary characters. The most evident difference is that liter-
ary characters are less concrete than cartoon characters. Protectable literary
characters must be developed verbally to the point at which the character's
response to incident becomes predictable, 82 whereas visually depicted charac-
ters can be sketched with a "few strokes of the pen and need not possess any
behavioral attributes."88 As Professor Kurtz states:
Using identical language or a close paraphrase to describe a literary charac-
ter is analogous to copying the portrait of a visually depicted character. But
when a literary character is copied, what is taken usually is more abstract,
an amalgamation of traits and elements that conjures up mental images. It
is far simpler to make visual comparisons than to compare abstractions.84
A graphic character may be created or drawn on paper. Once such a character
becomes physically manifested on paper, it exits the realm of idea and enters
that of expression.
A graphically depicted character conveys a concrete, physical image. Unlike
literary characters, which can only be pictured in a person's mind, cartoon
characters may be seen through one's eyes.85 The characterization of a cartoon
figure is acquired through its physical depiction: facial expressions, anatomical
features, and attire. The public can readily predict how a cartoon character
will appear in successive works. Thus, a cartoon character's concrete expres-
sion allows for easy comparison to infringing works.
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of providing copyright protection to
cartoon characters in Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications.8 In Detective
Comics, the court held that the character Wonderman infringed the copy-
rights in eleven monthly issues of Action Comics magazine, featuring the
character Superman.87 The court focused on the similarity of the two charac-
ters' costumes and antics of miraculous strength.88 The court then stated:
We think it plain that the defendants have used more than general types
and ideas and have appropriated the pictorial and literary details embodied
in the complainant's copyrights. . . . So far as the pictorial representations
and verbal descriptions of "Superman" are not a mere delineation of a be-
nevolent Hercules, but embody an arrangement of incidents and literary ex-
pressions original with the author, they [the representations] are proper sub-
82. See supra Section I (discussing the extent to which a literary character must be developed
to be granted copyright protection).
83. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 2.11.3, at 159.
84. Kurtz, supra note 25, at 451.
85. Id.
86. 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
87. Id. at 433.
88. Both Wonderman and Superman had miraculous strength and speed. Each concealed his
strength behind ordinary clothing. Further, the antics of each were similar, especially the fact that
each would remove his clothing to reveal a skin-tight acrobatic costume. Id.
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jects of copyright. .. ."
The court thus granted the cartoon character Superman copyright protec-
tion. The court's examination went beyond the simple comparison of the char-
acter's physical features. While physical features are important to the pro-
tectability analysis, characters that perform certain actions and acquire
distinct personality traits gain protection beyond mere physical appearance.90
The copyright protection in the character Superman includes his personality
and antics as depicted in the comic. Such antics and personality traits increase
the extent of copyright protection provided a character." As a result, even
though Wonderman was not an exact physical replica of Superman, the simi-
larity between the two characters' antics and personalities brought the charac-
ter Wonderman into an area protected by the copyright in the character
Superman. 2
The court thus found that Wonderman infringed the copyright in the char-
acter Superman.9" The court noted that the creator of a graphic character is
"not entitled to a monopoly of the mere character of a 'Superman' who is a
blessing to mankind." '9 The mere idea of a superhero with exceptional
strength is not protected. Only the specific exploits, costume, and physical fea-
tures unique to the particular character are protected.95 Once protected, how-
ever, simply changing the names of the protected characters, as well as the
plot and setting, will not avoid an action for copyright infringement."6
Another major decision regarding the copyrightability of characters is Walt
Disney Productions v. Air Pirates.9 7 Air Pirates involved the use, by the de-
fendant, of Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse, Donald Duck, Goofy and other
well known Disney characters in an adult comic book. In the comic, the story
centered around "a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney characters as active
members of a free-thinking, promiscuous, drug-ingesting counterculture."9 8
89. Id. at 433-34.
90. See Detective Comics v. Fox Publications, 46 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
91. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th
Cir. 1977).
92. Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, II F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940); cf. Allen v.
Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 366 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The faces of cartoon
characters are of course . . . copyrightable."); Detective Comics v. Fox Publications, 46 F. Supp.
at 874 (cartoon characters' physical features, alone, are copyrightable).
93. Bruns Publications, 111 F.2d at 433.
94. Id.
95. See Fox Publications, 46 F. Supp. 872 (holding that the defendant infringed Batman with
Robin the Wonderboy by deliberately copying the drawings and cartoons of Batman and his com-
panion, Robin; defendant called its cartoon characters The Lynx and Blackie the Mystery Boy).
96. National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951).
97. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
98. Id. at 753. The defendant, as put by one commentator, published "an 'underground' comic
book which had placed several well-known Disney cartoon characters in incongruous settings
where they engaged in activities clearly antithetical to the accepted Mickey Mouse world of
scrubbed faces, bright smiles and happy endings." Id. at 753 (citing Kevin W. Wheelwright,
Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564, 571 (1976)).
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Disney Productions claimed that use of these characters infringed its copy-
rights. The court held that Mickey Mouse and the other Disney characters
were worthy of copyright protection apart from the story in which they origi-
nally appeared. 9" The court distinguished Warner Brothers Pictures v. CBS,100
stating that "while many literary characters may embody little more than an
unprotected idea, a comic book character, which has physical as well as con-
ceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some unique elements of expres-
sion." 101 While granting Disney's characters copyright protection,02 the court
left open the question of whether a similarity of characters may be infringing
although consisting merely of graphic depiction or whether in addition to simi-
larity of physical image there must also be similarity of the character's person-
ality, pattern of speech, abilities, and other traits. 03 "Thus, visual similarity
plus a similarity in character traits, may prove sufficient to constitute an in-
fringement even where the names of the . . . characters differ.' 04
In a factually similar case, Warner Bros. v. ABC, the Second Circuit spelled
out what characteristics constituted sufficient delineation to deserve copyright
protection.' 00 The court found that the television show "The Greatest Ameri-
can Hero," featuring as its main character Ralph Hinkley, was not sufficiently
similar to the fictional character Superman and did not infringe plaintiff's
copyrights in numerous works featuring the character Superman. 6 The plain-
tiffs owned the copyrights in various works embodying the character Super-
man, thereby acquiring copyright protection for the Superman character
itself. 07
The court defined the character Superman as "a brave, fearless hero en-
dowed with superhuman powers" who came to Earth from a fictional planet.'08
Superman uses his exceptional strength, speed, X-ray vision, fantastic hearing,
and ability to fly to overcome evil villains that he confronts in each of his
adventures. When Superman is not fighting criminals, he takes on the persona
of the mild-mannered, bumbling newspaper reporter Clark Kent. The plaintiff
claimed that Ralph Hinkley displayed characteristics similar to Superman.
99. Id. at 754-55.
100. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
101. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 755. The court expressly distinguished Warner Bros., stating that
"[b]ecause comic book characters ...are distinguishable from literary characters, the Warner
Brothers language does not preclude protection of Disney's characters." Id.
102. Id.; see also United Features Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1480
(S.D. Fla. 1983) (cartoon strip characters protected); Bayard F. Berman & Joel E. Boxer, Copy-
right Infringement of Audio Visual Works and Characters, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1979).
103. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at 2-176.
104. 1 id.
105. 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[I]n determining whether a character in a second
work infringes a cartoon character, courts generally consider not only the visual resemblance, but
also the totality of the character's attributes and traits.").
106. Id. at 235.
107. See Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940) (granting
the comic book character Superman copyright protection).
108. Warner Bros., 720 F.2d at 236.
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The Ralph Hinkley character is an "ordinary guy" who stumbles across a red
suit and cape that, when worn, provides Hinkley with.fantastic powers similar
to those of Superman. Hinkley, however, has great difficulty with his super-
powers, using them fearfully and awkwardly.'
The court gave great deference to the totality of the character's attributes
and traits.110 It stated that an alleged infringing character must capture the
"total concept and feel" of the copyrighted character to infringe. "' Thus, in
determining infringement of a copyrighted character, the court found:
Ultimately, care must be taken to draw the elusive distinction between a
substantially similar character that infringes a copyrighted character despite
slight differences in appearance, behavior, or traits, and a somewhat similar
though non-infringing character whose appearance, behavior, or traits, and
especially their combination, significantly differ from those of a copyrighted
character, even though the second character is reminiscent of the first one.
Stirring one's memory of a copyrighted character is not the same as appear-
ing to be substantially similar to that character and only the latter is
infringement. 1 '
The above statement sheds light on what constitutes sufficient delineation to
afford a character copyright protection. The copyright in the character Super-
man lies in his appearance, behavior, and traits. The court held that Superman
had no monopoly on self-propelled flight." 3 It reasoned that the protectable
element of Superman was the total perception of the character: his appear-
ance, demeanor, and superhuman skills." 4
Superman's extraordinary skills alone, therefore, are not copyrightable.
Again, the greatest emphasis was placed on the difference in character appear-
ance, actions, and skills:
The total perception of the Hinkley character is not substantially similar
to that of Superman. On the contrary, it is profoundly different. Superman
looks and acts like a brave, proud hero, who has dedicated his life to com-
bating the forces of evil. Hinkley looks and acts like a timid, reluctant hero,
who accepts his missions grudgingly and prefers to get on with his normal
life. Superman performs his superhuman feats with skill, verve, and dash,
clearly the master of his own destiny. Hinkley is perplexed by the superhu-
man powers his costume confers and uses them in a bumbling comical fash-
ion. In the genre of superheros, Hinkley follows Superman as, in the genre
of detectives, Inspector Clouseau follows Sherlock Holmes. 1 5
109. Id. at 236-37.
110. Id. at 241.
111. Id. at 240; see also Eden Toys v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982)
(noting "total concept and feel" is pertinent); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDon-
ald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (same).
112. Warner Bros., 720 F.2d at 242.
113. Id. at 243-44.




The Court found that Hinkley's traits differed significantly from Super-
man's. ' The court did state, however, that, had the second artist endowed his
character with Superman's general appearance and skills but portrayed him as
a villain or in a different setting, the second character would not be a new
addition to the superhero collection.117 In not-so-express terms, the court
therefore spelled out that a character may be sufficiently delineated to afford
copyright protection when the character's physical appearance, demeanor, and
behavior are known to be associated with that particular character.
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, along with these other cases, leaves
little doubt that a cartoon character is a separate copyrightable component of
the original work.' 8 The character's visual element provides something con-
crete and tangible that can be the subject of objective comparison." 9 Thus, the
faces and physical features of cartoon characters are copyrightable. 20 And the
courts have even extended protection to include behavioral and emotional
characteristics of the character as well. 21 The cases suggest that a cartoon
character's physical features provide both a foundation for determining copy-
right protectability and the basis upon which infringement is determined. Su-
perman's red cape and blue costume may warrant the author protection from
others creating and using a similarly costumed character. But Superman's
abilities, personality, and behavior, together with his distinct appearance, war-
rant Superman copyright protection beyond the more limited protection
granted to his physical appearance alone. Clearly, stock or sketchily-drawn
characters do not deserve copyright protection. But well-drawn characters that
demonstrate emotion and behavioral attributes should be, and are, protected.
Characters that an author fails to adequately delineate, therefore, usually
are not entitled to the sanctions of the copyright statute.1 22 For example, a
stick figure would not deserve copyright protection, because it is not ade-
quately delineated. On the other hand, providing the stick figure with a green
complexion, and endowing the figure with personality through interaction with
other characters and surroundings, may give rise to copyright protection. Most
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978); see also King
Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1924) (holding a cartoon character was
protected by the copyright in the book in which it appeared); United Features Syndicate v. Sun-
rise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ("An individual character featured in a
comic strip is a separate copyrightable component of the comic strip.").
119. Kurtz, supra note 25, at 450 ("The appearance of a cartoon character ordinarily creates
the dominant impression against which another character may be compared. Thus, if the original
aspects of visual expression are closely copied, that should be sufficient for a finding of infringe-
ment, even if the two characters behave differently.").
120. Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 366 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The
faces of cartoon characters are of course . . . copyrightable . . . but they are distinguishable from
human faces in that they are essentially artifacts.") (citations omitted).
121. See Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983); Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at
755; Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, Ill F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
122. Turner, supra note 12, at 351.
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certainly, the cartoon character Gumby, with his green complexion and unique
personality, deserves copyright protection. Hence, the penalty an author must
bear for making his character indistinct is loss of copyright protection for that
character.12
III. CHARACTERS APPEARING IN MOTION PICTURES
The issue of copyright protectability of characters appearing in motion pic-
tures opens the door to a new array of problems. Motion picture characters are
depicted visually, in the same manner as graphic characters. A viewer of a
movie can see a tangible expression of the character portrayed in a motion
picture. Motion picture characters appearing in motion pictures also acquire
physical and emotional traits much like characters appearing in a literary
work. Characters in motion pictures also acquire visual images in addition to
the literary characteristics. Thus, due to the manner in which motion pictures
are displayed, such characters do not fit squarely into either the literary or
cartoon category. As a result, some motion picture characters have been
treated as literary characters124 while others have been treated as graphic
characters. 12'
Two courts have wrestled with the dual aspects of motion picture charac-
ters. In Anderson v. Stallone,1 26 the Central District of California applied
both the restrictive story being told test and the character delineation test to
determine whether the characters from the motion picture Rocky were pro-
tectable by copyright outside the movie. 2 7 The court applied both tests be-
cause it could not determine which test was proper.12' The plaintiff in Ander-
son claimed that he wrote the story used in the motion picture Rocky IV. The
court found that the characters from the previous three Rocky movies were
protected by copyright and, therefore, could not be used in a novel or story
without permission.1 '
The court first applied the character delineation test, stating that the
"Rocky characters are one of the most highly delineated group [sic] of charac-
123. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.).
124. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (characters
from the motion picture Rocky); Universal City Studios v. Kamar Indus., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (E.T.); Warner Bros. v. Film ventures Int'l, 403 F. Supp. 522 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (Regan from The Exorcist).
125. See, e.g., Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A Team" characters); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (H.R. Pufn-
stuf); Silverman v. CBS, 632 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Amos and Andy), rev'd on other
grounds, 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (charac-
ters from the motion picture Rocky); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Star Wars characters).
126. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
127. Id. at 1166.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1167.
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ters in modern American cinema. ' 130 Further, the Rocky characters-Rocky,
Apollo Creed, Clubber Lang, and Paulie-were delineated so extensively that
they were protected from bodily appropriation when the group was transported
into a sequel. The court did not decide whether any character, apart from
Rocky himself, was alone sufficiently delineated to garner copyright protec-
tion."' But the court did find that the character Rocky, standing alone, was
entitled to copyright protection.182 The court also held that the other charac-
ters, as a group, were protectable by copyright."' 8 The key, of course, was the
tremendous detail with which the characters' physical and emotional traits
were portrayed."" Indeed, the Rocky character's traits, ranging from his
speaking mannerisms to his physical characteristics, were paramount.18 5
Second, in applying the story being told test, the court determined that the
characters were so highly developed and central to the plot of the movies-the
movies did not have intricate plots-that the characters constituted the story
being told and deserved copyright protection.' The Anderson court recog-
nized that both visual and literal elements are important in defining motion
picture characters.
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp.,'1" the
Ninth Circuit also recognized the duality of television characters. There, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, McDonald's Corporation, used characters
from plaintiff's television program in its commercials. 18 8 The plaintiff's pro-
gram featured the character H. R. Pufnstuf and a world inhabited by
animated plants and fanciful creatures. The court stated, "The expression in-
herent in the H. R. Pufnstuf series differs markedly from its relatively simple
idea. The characters each have developed personalities and particular ways of
interacting with one another and their environment. The physical setting also
has several unique features."' 8 Thus, the court examined the degree of de-
lineation of the characters' personalities. The court also turned its attention to
the visual aspect of the characters and made a detailed comparison of the
physical features of the two sets of characters."" After a thorough examina-
130. Id. at 1166.






137. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
138. Id. at 1161-62.
139. Id. at 1169. The court stated, "The characters are also similar. Both lands are governed
by mayors who have disproportionately large round heads dominated by long wide mouths. They
are assisted by keystone cop characters. Both lands feature strikingly similar crazy scientists and a
multi-armed evil creature." Id. at 1167 n.9.
140. Id. at 1166. The court set forth a two-step test for substantial similarity. First, it must be
determined whether there is substantial similarity in ideas. This may be accomplished by an "ex-
trinsic test," which depends on specific criteria that can be listed and analyzed. Second, it must be
determined whether there is substantial similarity in the expression of the ideas, which is accom-
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tion, the court stated the degree to which delineation brought the "total con-
cept and feel" of the characters out of the realm of idea and into that of
protectable expression.141 Once again, the importance of both visual and liter-
ary characteristics was recognized in evaluating the protectability of motion
picture characters.
Some courts, however, recognize motion picture characters as containing
only literary or conceptual elements. The Central District of California
adopted such an approach in Warner Bros. v. Film Ventures International.142
The plaintiff held the copyright in the movie The Exorcist, which featured as
its main character a twelve-year-old girl named Regan. The character Regan
was attempting to overcome her demonic possession with the help of a Jesuit
priest. The plaintiff alleged that the main character in the movie Beyond The
Door, a story also concerning demonic possession, infringed the copyright in
the Regan character. The court held that characters in plays ordinarily are not
protectable by copyright unless the character is "distinctively delineated."1 13
The court relied on Warner Bros. v. CBS, the "Sam Spade Case," for the
proposition that a character is not protectable under copyright law unless "the
character really constitutes the story being told. 11 4 Thus, the court concluded
that the Exorcist story was not subordinated to the character Regan and,
therefore, Regan did not deserve copyright protection. 1"
Similarly, other courts have stated that a motion picture character cannot
be protected by copyright if the character acts merely as a vehicle for telling
the story."' In Universal City Studios v. Kamar Industries, the movie charac-
ter E.T. was found protected by copyright because the character was central
to the story.1 47 E.T. was most certainly more than a mere vehicle for telling
the story. Thus, these cases show that in applying the story being told analysis
to motion picture characters, courts look at the plot and the role of the charac-
plished by an "intrinsic test." Id. at 1165-66; see Kurtz, supra note 25, at 468.
141. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167.
142. 403 F. Supp. 522, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 971 (1955)).
145. The court stated:
I cannot conclude that the story "The Exorcist" was subordinated to the character
Regan. Even, arguendo, if this were held to be true, there is substantial difference
between the character of Regan, a demure child who turns into a profane monster
and whose possession is driven from her by religious means, and Jessica, a mature
woman in the early stages of pregnancy whose possession exemplifies itself by a more
rapid than normal development of her fetus, and whose possession is not expelled by
religious faith.
Id.
146. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Kamar Indus., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1162, 1165 (S.D.
Tex. 1982).
147. Id. at 1166. The court in Kamar Industries found that E.T. was a distinctive and well
developed character. Id. The application of the story being told test in this situation is peculiar.
E.T. resembles a cartoon character more than a human. Most courts apply the character delinea-
tion to cartoon characters.
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ter within the plot to determine whether copyright protection is proper. There-
fore, the images created by the words must be examined, not just the detailed
delineation of the character through visual means.
In contrast, other courts look strictly at the visual depiction of the movie
character to determine whether the character is sufficiently delineated to af-
ford copyright protection.' 8 A case expressly addressing the visual nature of
motion picture characters is Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products."4 The pro-
ducers of the movie Star Wars and their licensee, Kenner Products, claimed
that Ideal Toy Corporation's ("Ideal's") 15 toys infringed the copyright in the
film Star Wars."' Ideal made toy figures that were similar to the Star Wars
characters Darth Vader, C-3PO, and R2-D2. The court agreed that the copy-
right in a dramatic work, such as a movie or play, can extend to cover charac-
ters in the story,"'1 and found that a three-dimensional object can infringe a
copyright in a two-dimensional object.' 58 The analysis that the court found
most useful for determining whether a character visually depicted in a movie
should be given copyright protection required consideration of the degree to
which the character was developed.154 Thus, the visual development of the
Star Wars characters was considered important:
The characters from "Star Wars" are elements in a drama; they have
"character" because they are part of a plot in which they interact with each
other. Thus, they have attributes which are suggested by the movie itself.
The toys have no such qualities as they exist in their basic, copyrighted
form.. . . Thus, any comparison will have to be made solely on the basis of
physical appearance; in other words, the sole attribute of the dolls will have
to be compared to only one attribute of the movie character.' 5'
Nevertheless, the court found that the physical similarities between the toys
and the movie characters were not substantial and therefore denied recovery
for copyright infringement."
148. See, e.g., Silverman v. CBS, 632 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Universal City Studios
v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner
Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
149. 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
150. Ideal Toy Corp. was the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action in which it sought a
finding that it did not infringe any rights possessed by Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation
and Kenner Products based upon licenses in the characters from Star Wars. Id. at 292.
151. Ideal Toy, 443 F. Supp. at 293.
152. Id. at 301.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court quoted Professor Nimmer's conclusion that "[a] character is most readily
protectible where both the original work and the copied work consist of cartoons or other graphic
representations rather than 'word portraits.'" Id. (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 30, at 135 (1976)).
155. Id. at 302.
156. Id. at 303. The court specified the similarities and differences of each as follows:
Briefly, the similarities and differences are these: Both Darth Vader and Knight of
Darkness are large, black-colored figures sporting capes and black helmets. However,
the Knight's head is quite different in appearance, being rounded and simple in line
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In Universal City Studios v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc.,157 the Central District of
California was faced with a similar problem. There, the plaintiff asserted a
claim for copyright infringement of the motion picture E.T.-The Extra-Ter-
restrial by an E.T. doll.1" The court recognized that the character E.T. pos-
sessed unique elements of expression and was potentially subject to protection
under copyright as an element of the motion picture.'59 Thus, the court
granted the owner of the copyright in E.T. preliminary relief enjoining the
production of dolls resembling the character E.T. 160 In so holding, extensive
weight was given to the physical elements of the motion picture character
E.T.161
As the foregoing discussion indicates, current jurisprudence in this area
mandates that a character must be sufficiently developed before a character
copyright infringement claim can be successful.162 A broad, abstract outline of
a character is insufficient to warrant the character copyright protection apart
from the original work in which the character appeared. Copyright protection
may be afforded to characters visually depicted in a television series or motion
picture. 6 3 But, once again, as with cartoon and literary characters, it is not
while Vader's head is a complex of sharp edges and protrusions. Furthermore, the
Knight's torso is dominated by a shiny, silver metallic tunic, and he sports a promi-
nent grey ray-gun, a weapon totally different from that of Vader.
C-3PO and Zem-21 are both humanoid robots made of metal; both display metallic
joints and protrusions. However, Zem-21 is a bright silver color, while C-3PO is dis-
tinctly bronze- or gold-colored. More importantly, Zem-21 sports a rather grotesque
green head which dominates the rest of his body and which is totally unlike C-3PO's
bronze- or gold-colored head. Finally, Zem-21's body is distinctly supple (a product of
its "human" origins), while C-3PO's body is more mechanical and rigid.
At the short end of the line, both R2-D2 and Zeroid are small, round, computer-
type metallic robots with domed tops and two appendages. However, Zeroid is grey
while R2-D2 is predominantly white; Zeroid is "thin" while R2-D2 is "thick"; Zeroid
moves on rather sizable tractor treads and its "arms" do not reach the ground, while
R2-D2 moves on its much slimmer appendages alone.
Id.
157. 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (C.D. Cal. 1982). This case was different than Universal City
Studios v. Kamar Industries, discussed supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. In J.A.R.
Sales, the defendant was producing a doll that resembled the motion picture character E.T. In
Kamar Industries, the defendant was selling mugs with the slogan "E.T.-phone home" written
on them.
158. J.A.R. Sales, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 679-80.
159. Id. at 683.
160. Id. at 684.
161. Id. at 683. The characters in the computer game Pac-Man have also been found to be
protected under copyright. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). The gobbler and ghost monsters were expres-
sions. The defendant used the same basic characters with similar features that, for the gobbler,
included the relative size and shape of the body, the Y-shaped mouths, the distinctive gobbling
action, and the manner in which the character disappears upon being captured. Id. at 618.
162. See also Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding stock charac-
ters too general to deserve protection), affd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984).
163. Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988).
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clear which standard should be applied in determining when motion picture
characters are protected from bodily appropriations.'"
IV. A PROPOSED TEST TO DETERMINE THE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
AFFORDED LITERARY, GRAPHIC, AND MOTION PICTURE CHARACTERS
The question still remains: When is a character entitled to copyright protec-
tion? As stated, literary characters can gain protection if the character is ex-
pressly delineated and especially distinctive. 6 " But the courts do not spell out
what makes a character expressly distinctive."'e Some courts deny copyright
protection to literary characters unless the character constitutes the story be-
ing told. 6 ' But such a test would seem to protect characters that appear in
stories devoid of a plot, where the character study constitutes all, or substan-
tially all, of the work."' There may exist rare examples of such character
study works, but, for most practical purposes, if the story being told rule were
followed, essentially all literary characters would be excluded from the realm
of copyright protection."' The story being told test is archaic and rarely ap-
plied. It serves actually to prevent protection of well developed and delineated
characters. Further, such a test is not in accord with Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp. or the protection granted to cartoon characters.
Likewise, the protection of cartoon characters is murky. The level of de-
lineation necessary for a cartoon character to acquire copyright protection is
unclear. Does delineation arise simply from the character's physical appear-
ance? Or is more required, such as the character's traits and behavior? 17 0 The
only clear aspect of these tests is that common or stock characters cannot be
protected by copyrights.' 7 ' Because of these uncertainties, it is difficult to de-
termine the extent of copyright protection a character may be afforded outside
the story in which it originally appeared.
There has been just as much confusion in determining the copyright pro-
tectability of motion picture characters. In Anderson v. Stallone,17 1 the court
164. See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (court
stating that it did not know which test to apply).
165. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid. 683
F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
166. See id. at 391 (discussing the character Tarzan).
167. See Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
971 (1955); Warner Bros. v. Film Ventures Int'l, 403 F. Supp. 522 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
168. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979).
169. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at 2-175.
170. See Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding attributes and non-
physical characteristics determinative of copyright protectability).
171. See Jones v. CBS, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Basic character
types are not copyrightable.. . . (O]nly a uniquely developed character with some degree of nov-
elty is copyrightable."); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding charac-
ters too basic and abstract to constitute an expression of an idea).
172. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
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found that "[t]he precise legal standard th[e] court should apply in determin-
ing when a character may be afforded copyright protection is fraught with
uncertainty. . . . However, out of an abundance of caution th[e] Court . ..
determine[d] the protectability of the . .. characters under both tests."'1 8
Numerous commentators as well have expressed their displeasure with the
current standards used to determine when a character may be protected by
copyright."7 4 Given the commercial significance of fictional characters gener-
ally, the confusion about when a fictional character may be protected by copy-
right protection must come to an end.
A unified test is necessary. The test to determine when literary, graphic, and
motion picture characters are protectable under the copyright law should be
both easy to understand and easy to use. The new standard should contain
elements of both the character delineation test and the story being told test.
Such a standard is proposed below.
The proposed unified standard uses a sliding scale approach, taking into
consideration certain crucial factors. The physical depiction of the character,
the personality traits of the character, and the setting of the story in which the
character originally appears are considered in determining whether the char-
acter should be granted copyright protection. Weighing each of these ele-
ments, a court then determines whether the overall feel of the character is that
of a highly recognizable or expressly distinctive character. A highly delineated
or sufficiently distinctive character deserves copyright protection. Obviously,
the trier of fact will be required to consider all aspects of the work that are
important to the audience. 17 5 But the basic underlying principle of the unified
test is that the more recognizable or distinctive the character, the more protec-
tion (through copyright laws) the character will be granted.
A. Delineation of the Character's Physical Appearance
In the unified, sliding-scale test for literary, cartoon, and motion picture
characters, a court will first examine the character's physical delineation. A
character's physical features alone may be sufficient to provide the character
copyright protection .17  But copyright protection in a character's physical fea-
tures will limit protection only to exact duplicates or reproductions of the orig-
173. Id. at 1165 (referring to both the story being told and the character delineation tests).
174. See Brylawski, supra note 7, at 77 (noting that current analyses of copyright protection of
characters is inconsistent and unclear); Kurtz, supra note 25, at 520-22 (suggesting that much of
this confusion results from permitting the doctrines to drift too far from their conceptual moor-
ings); Turner, supra note 12, at 348-49 (noting that characters do not easily fit into the literal
language of the copyright statute).
175. Berman & Boxer, supra note 102, at 332.
176. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (painting of Doro-
thy infringed the copyright in the movie The Wizard of Oz); Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc.,
679 F. Supp. 360, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (faces of cartoon characters are protectable); United
Features Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (comic strip
characters protectable); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (physical attributes of motion picture character protectable by copyright).
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inal character. 7 Such protection will also prohibit reproductions of "the es-
sential characteristics" of the original character with only "slight differences
and variations." ' 8 The limitation on the degree of copyright protection was
explained by the Ninth Circuit as follows:
The idea and the expression will coincide when the expression provides
nothing new or additional over the idea. Thus, the expression of a jeweled
bee pin contains nothing new over the idea of a jeweled bee pin. Returning
to our own example, the idea of a plaster statute [sic] of a nude will proba-
bly coincide with the expression of that idea when an inexpensive manufac-
turing process is used. There will be no separately distinguishable features in
the statute's [sic] expression over the idea of a plaster nude statute [sic].
The complexity and artistry of the expression of an idea will separate it
from even the most banal idea. Michelangelo's David is, as an idea, no more
than a statute [sic] of a nude male. But no one would question the proposi-
tion that if a copyrighted work it would deserve protection even against the
poorest of imitations. This is because so much more was added in the ex-
pression over the idea. When idea and expression coincide, there will be
protection against nothing other than identical copying of the work ...
Therefore, the scope of copyright protection increases with the extent ex-
pression differs from the idea. 17'
Furthermore, this visual-depiction prong of the proposed test is simple to
apply. A person can view the concrete and tangible elements of characters. It
is easy, for example, to visualize cartoon characters. And the visual depiction
provides something concrete to which the accused infringing subject can be
compared. 80 For example, take the "Peanuts" character Charlie Brown. Men-
177. King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 534 (2d Cir. 1924); Ideal Toy, 443 F.
Supp. at 302. The court in Ideal Toy examined the physical characteristics of a toy alleged to
infringe the Darth Vader character from the movie Star Wars. The court found significant differ-
ences between the two characters' physical features. In so holding, the court stated:
The defendants have no more right to a monopoly in the theme of a black-robed,
helmeted, evil figure in outerspace conflict with a humanoid and a smaller non-hu-
manoid robot than Shakespeare would have had in the theme of a "riotous knight who
kept wassail to the discomfort of the household" and who had conflicts with "a fop-
pish steward who became amorous of his mistress."
Id. at 304. However, the toy could have infringed the movie character if it had been an exact
reproduction. See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305.
178. Fleisher Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934) (Betty
Boop), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935).
179. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167-68
(9th Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
180. See id.; Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding difficulty
of delineating a character is reduced with visual characters); Detective Comics v. Bruns Publica-
tions, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (basing infringement on similarity of physical aspects of char-
acters); Anderson v. Stallone, II U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (finding movie char-
acters had physical characteristics that assisted a copyright analysis); Burroughs v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting physical features of Tarzan);
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (utilizing special copyright
analysis for graphic characters).
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tion of his name brings to mind an image of the round-headed, brown-eyed
figure with a strand or two of curled hair upon his head. Numerous people
have seen Charlie Brown depicted in a variety of cartoon strips. Charlie Brown
has a distinct and concrete appearance that people can visualize. 181
C 
C1938*
Thus, Charlie Brown's physical characteristics, as portrayed in numerous pub-
lications, can easily be compared to an alleged infringing work. The express
physical delineation of the character's appearance gives the character life
apart from the work in which it appears.
Since cartoon characters have a concrete physical delineation, sufficient sim-
ilarities in physical appearance between two characters should alone constitute
copyright infringement, apart from the character's other attributes and traits.
In fact, in a case where Charlie Brown and other Peanuts characters were
reproduced into three-dimensional dolls, the court found that such dolls in-
fringed the copyrights in the Peanuts characters."8 " The court reached that
result without examining the characters' personalities or behavior.183 Likewise,
courts have found that the characters Betty Boop,'84 Raggedy Ann and
Andy, 8' and Sparky the Horse 8" were infringed by either dolls or figures that
depicted the cartoon characters. When a doll or toy is the alleged infringer,
there is nothing to compare but the physical appearance of the characters.187
As Professor Kurtz stated:
This similarity must be virtually exact . . with no more than slight differ-
181. Charles M. Schultz, Peanuts, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1990, at C6 (Charles Shultz' character,
Charlie Brown, from the cartoon strip "Peanuts").
* Charlie Brown reprinted by permission of UFS, Inc.
182. United Features Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
183. Id.
184. Fleisher Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934).
185. Gruelle v. Molly-'Es Doll Outfitters, 94 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1937).
186. King Features Syndicate V. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1924).
187. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (examining the




ences and variations, or it will not be sufficiently particular and concrete to
amount to an appropriation of original elements of expression. If the horse
Sparky is closely copied, there is infringement; if a horse reminiscent of
Sparky is created, there is not.' 88
Visual aspects of cartoon characters may thus bring a cartoon character into
the area protected by copyright. The physical appearance of a cartoon charac-
ter creates a tangible impression of that character. Because a cartoon charac-
ter is highly delineated in physical appearance alone, such characters should
be protected by copyright outside the original depiction of the character.
Likewise, motion picture characters possess the same highly delineated
physical characteristics as do cartoon characters. The motion picture character
is concrete and tangible; it possesses elements separate from the words that
comprise the story. A motion picture does more than tell a story; it conveys
two-dimensional sights and sounds in a manner that stimulates most of the
human senses.' 89
Obviously, however, there are differences between the visual representation
of motion picture characters and the visual elements of cartoon characters.
Motion picture characters are portrayed by actors, and in many motion pic-
tures, the same characters have been portrayed by numerous actors. For ex-
ample, the character James Bond has been portrayed by Sean Connery, Roger
Moore, and Timothy Dalton, among others. Likewise, the character Rocky
played by Sylvester Stallone could easily be played by some other actor. Crea-
tive expression cannot be found in the physiognomy of the actor.' 90 Therefore,
a motion picture character, portrayed by an actor, should rarely be provided
copyright protection based upon the physical appearance of the character. 1 '
And any copyright protection lying in a motion picture character's physical
appearance should be limited.
The limited copyright protection that motion picture characters should be
given is justified, at least in part, by the fact that actors have protected rights
in controlling unauthorized commercial exploitation of their likenesses.' 9' The
California Supreme Court, in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,'98 held that the
188. Kurtz, supra note 25, at 450.
189. Berman & Boxer, supra note 102, at 324.
190. Kurtz, supra note 25, at 471.
191. Berman & Boxer, supra note 102, at 330-31. There, the authors noted:
[T]he more "human" the character is who is depicted in the movie or television work,
the less likely that he or she will be found to be, in the event of copyright infringe-
ment litigation, sufficiently delineated to merit separate copyright protection. On the
other hand, if presented in a science fiction, space, or horror setting, with the attend-
ant visual and aural trappings, even the most simplistic and simple-minded of charac-
ters, with all due respect to "R2-D2" and "Pufnstuf," have a strong claim for copy-
right protection.
Id.
192. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1090, 1096 (Cal.
1979).
193. 603 P.2d 425, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1090 (Cal. 1979).
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actor Bela Lugosi had a personal interest, during his lifetime, in controlling
the use of his likeness in his portrayal of the character Dracula.194 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court extended this right of publicity to include the actor's
own likeness while portraying a particular fictional character. 195 But Chief
Justice Bird noted in dissent that an actor's rights are limited to the use of his
likeness only:
This protection extends only to the individual's likeness-a representation
or image of the person-while portraying the particular character. Nothing
herein is intended to extend protection to the idea for the character or to the
character itself. Nothing in the right of publicity prohibits another person,
for example, from developing and playing a sympathetic tramp character
similar to the one portrayed by [Charlie] Chaplin.19'
Therefore, the visual element alone should not provide a human motion picture
character copyright protection.
Despite this separate right of publicity, however, the distinct visual and au-
ral elements motion picture characters possess-separate from the word pic-
tures of literary characters-cannot be ignored. The motion picture charac-
ter's appearance should be a factor in determining whether the character
deserves copyright protection. 197 The general physical features of a character
serve as a base for determining the character's copyright protectability. But in
order for a motion picture character to be afforded copyright protection, the
character must acquire distinctive personality traits. In fact, the court in
Warner Bros. v. ABC'" examined the appearance of each actor in the subject
film to determine whether the alleged infringer captured the "total concept
and feel" of the copyrighted character in dispute. The court stated that part of
Superman's character delineation comprised a tall, well built, dark and hand-
some man.' " It then found that the alleged infringing character, Ralph Hink-
ley, was medium height and slight and had unkempt blond hair. 00 Because of
these differences, the court held that the Hinkley character did not infringe.
Furthermore, it follows logically that motion picture characters that rely
less on the human form, such as cartoon characters, should be granted copy-
194. Id. at 431, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1096.
195. Id. The limitation on an actor's right to publicity is an issue currently in debate. However,
that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
196. Id. at 445 n.26, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1108 n.26 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
197. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). In Gracen, a painting
of Dorothy from a scene in the movie The Wizard of Oz was held to be not an original derivative
work copyrightable under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988). The painting was an
almost exact duplication of a scene from the movie. The character in the painting resembled Judy
Garland, the actress who portrayed Dorothy. It depicted Dorothy in the same clothes and hair
style as in the movie. The appearance of the character was given great weight. Gracen, 698 F.2d
at 305.
198. 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983).
199. Id. at 235.
200. Id. at 236.
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right protection in the character's appearance alone.20 1 When a motion picture
character (such as the Star Wars characters C-3PO, R2-D2, or Darth Vader)
is compared with an object with no preexisting attributes, such as a doll, ap-
pearance is the only available means to determine copyrightability. 202 How-
ever, the more human the character, the more the combination of the charac-
ter's physical, emotional, and behavioral traits must be examined.
Both the physical appearance and personality of the character should also
be examined to determine whether the character's overall presentation justifies
copyright protection.103 With human characters, the physical appearance pro-
vides a starting point for analysis, but the nature of the character's personality
traits is a significant factor in determining whether the character is protected
under the copyright laws. With cartoon motion picture characters, however,
the character's physical appearance alone may be sufficient to warrant copy-
right protection. In any event, a motion picture character's physical appear-
ance should be protected when certain traits the character possesses are dis-
tinctive and have become associated with the character by the public. If not,
no protection should be available unless the other criteria are met.Rarely will a literary character be described in sufficient detail to warrant
copyright protection based solely upon the character's physical appearance.
Obviously, it is often difficult to describe the physical appearance of a charac-
ter using words alone. A reader might use his or her own personal experiences
to mold a visual picture of a literary character. But each reader would likely
draw a slightly different picture based on his or her experiences. The following
passage provides an example:
Michele, perspiring and rosy, was coming toward her, her red hair in disar-
ray above her dark eyes, her slender, small-waisted figure reflected
thricefold in the mirrors which Andre had installed on the walls so that she
might watch her own progress. She wore a rather short white dress that
ended just above her ankles, and black slippers on tiny feet.2 0'
Logically, reading this passage causes each reader to draw a mental picture of
the woman described. But in all likelihood each reader's mental image of the
character will be slightly different. The preceding passage demonstrates noth-
ing more than the author's idea. The author's description is too vague and too
broad to amount to protectable expression. A literary description is not like a
graphic representation that can be seen, because the details in a literary char-
acter are left to the reader to create in his mind. As the clich6 goes, a picture
is worth a thousand words.
An idea, such as a literary description, cannot be protected by copyright.' 05
201. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
202. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir.
1977); Ideal Toy, 443 F. Supp. at 302.
203. Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
204. PATRICIA MATTHEws, DANCER OF DREAMs 4 (1927).
205. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1168.
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A copyright in a literary character's physical description would grant such a
character too vast an area of copyright protection. This is not to say that a
literary character's physical description can never be protected by copyright.
An author may depict a literary character's physical characterization in such
detail that the characterization may be protected by copyright. More often
than not, however, the literary character's physical description will be com-
bined with the character's personality traits to form a character deserving
copyright protection.
The physical representation of any character (whether graphic, literary, or
motion picture) may be protected by copyright outside the original work in
which it appeared.2 °0 Protection afforded to a character's physical features,
however, should be limited. Under the proposed test, the protection afforded a
character's physical appearance is extended only to exact, or nearly exact, re-
productions of the original character.20 7 Protection should extend no further.
Therefore, in sum, a character should be granted limited copyright protection
in the manifestation of its physical appearance apart from any other features
it may possess. The logical corollary of this principle is that the scope of a
character's copyright protection should thus increase as the character develops
distinctive personality traits associated with the character.
B. Delineation of the Character's Personality Traits
The second element courts should examine in determining the copyright
protectability of characters apart from the original work in which they appear
is the characters' personality traits. Courts should ask whether the characters
are uniquely developed.208 Copyright protection should be granted only to well
developed characters. 09
As discussed above, a character's physical appearance may bring that char-
acter into the arena of copyright protection.210 But not all characters are pro-
tectable based upon physical delineation alone. Even lightly sketched charac-
206. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983); Walt Disney Prods. v.
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); see also
Pellegrino v. American Greeting Corp., 592 F. Supp. 459, 462 (D.S.D. 1984) (Ziggy character on
greeting card protectable); United Features Syndicate v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475,
1480 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ("Peanuts" characters protectable); Ideal Toy, 443 F. Supp. at 303 (Star
Wars characters protectable).
207. Ideal Toy, 443 F. Supp. at 302-03; see King Features v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 538 (2d
Cir. 1924) (holding that a three-dimensional object based on literary character can be infringe-
ment of literary character); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (2d Cir. 1914) (holding
that doll figures infringed a two-dimensional cartoon character).
208. Jones v. CBS, 733 F. Supp. 748, 753, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
("Basic character types are not copyrightable.... [O]nly a uniquely developed character with
some degree of novelty is copyrightable.").
209. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[N]o character infringe-
ment claim can succeed unless plaintiff's original conception sufficiently developed the character,
and defendants have copied this development and not merely the broader outlines.").
210. See supra Section IV.A.
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ters may be described in enough detail to afford copyright protection if the
concrete elements that comprise the character's personality are developed in
tremendous detail.21" ' Therefore, the character's personality and behavioral
traits may carry the character into the realm of copyright protection. Further-
more, in the case of characters that have protectable elements in the charac-
ter's physical appearance, personality traits will expand the scope of copyright
protection afforded the character.212
Therefore, a character must be sufficiently developed to be afforded copy-
right protection. To determine the extent to which the character is developed,
courts should consider at least two criteria. First, the character must be more
than a simple, stock character such as a voodoo doctor,21 a prisoner belonging
to a certain racial group,2" or a gun-carrying cowboy. Second, the character's
actions and display of emotions must add life to the character. A highly devel-
oped character is one that bears a unique resemblance to personalities discov-
ered in the normal routines of daily life.115 Hence, the standard of pro-
tectability of characters should be closely akin to the criteria that individuals
apply in daily life to determine if one individual truly knows another." 6 A
court must examine the character's actions, demeanor, and general behavioral
and personality attributes to determine whether the character is distinctive
and fully realized.217 A character can be said to have a distinctive personality
and thus be deserving of copyright protection when the character has been
delineated to the point where the behavior is relatively predictable;218 the char-
211. See Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding the characters in a
television series contained no descriptions that could be sufficient to afford copyright protection to
characters taken alone); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1160, 1166 (C.D. Cal.
1989).
212. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168-69 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("Therefore, the scope of copyright protection increases with the extent expression
differs from ideas."); see Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983); Detective
Comics v. Bruns Publications, Ill F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940).
213. Jones v. CBS, 733 F. Supp. 748, 753, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(denying copyright protection to a witch doctor character appearing in a television program be-
cause she was "not a developed character").
214. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding the character
appearing in a movie at a level of abstraction too basic to permit copyright protection).
215. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 2.7.2, at 128.
216. 1 Id.
217. Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242-43, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 101, 110 (2d Cir.
1983); see DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 307 (2d Cir.
1982); Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, Ill F.2d 432, 45 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 291 (2d Cir.
1940); Silverman v. CBS, 632 F. Supp. 1344, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd
on other grounds, 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989); Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F.
Supp. 388, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 683 F.2d 610, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
495 (2d Cir. 1982); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 212 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid in part and rev'd in part, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981); Detec-
tive Comics v. Fox Publications, 46 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Hill v. Whalen & Martell,
Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
218. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 2.7.2, at 128.
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acter, when placed in a new plot situation, will react in ways that are at once
both distinctive to that particular character and not surprising. 19 A character
is protectable when it becomes easily recognizable to the audience. For exam-
ple, when the audience "knows" the character-similar to when a person
knows a friend-the character becomes protectable. The test can best be un-
derstood through the use of some examples.
First, examine cartoon characters. The cartoon character has a literary as-
pect beyond its visual depiction. The combination of a cartoon character's vis-
ual and behavioral elements should strengthen the character's protectable
features.
Many cartoon characters have acquired distinct personalities. Again, ex-
amine Charlie Brown. People have grown to expect Charlie Brown to fail at
whatever he attempts. For example, people expect Charlie Brown to always
make the last out in baseball or miss kicking the football when his friend Lucy
holds the ball. These traits enhance Charlie Brown's characterization. Such
behavioral traits give a personality to a visually depicted character. Since a
cartoon character is perceived in its entirety,220 the addition of personality
traits to a visually depicted fictional character only adds to the degree of de-
lineation of that character. Thus, in the case of Charlie Brown, the copyright
protection would extend beyond his mere physical appearance. A character
should be found to infringe the Charlie Brown character even if the physical
appearance of the infringing character does not encompass the essential physi-
cal characteristics of the Charlie Brown character. If the alleged infringer pos-
sesses a small degree of similar physical characteristics, but possesses substan-
tially similar personality traits, the court should find infringement of the
copyright in the original character.221 Thus, the copyright protection afforded
to a cartoon character that develops distinct personality traits should be ex-
tended to both appearance and personality.
Motion picture characters, like cartoon characters, possess physical charac-
teristics as well as personality traits. In fact, some motion picture characters,
such as Darth Vader or Frankenstein's monster, more closely approximate car-
toon characters than human characters. 22 Those types of characters should be
treated as cartoon characters in determining copyright protectability. 2 That
is, the character's physical features may, in and of themselves, suffice for the
requirement for copyright infringement; any personality displayed by the char-
acter simply increases the scope of the copyright protection afforded the
character.
Consequently, characters portrayed by human actors should not be granted
219. 1 id.
220. Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983).
221. See Detective Comics v. Bruns Productions, I1I F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding cartoon
character Wonderman to infringe the copyright in the character Superman although physical
characteristics of the two characters differed).
222. Berman & Boxer, supra note 102, at 330.
223. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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similarly extensive protection. Because of an actor's right of publicity, the
more "human" the character depicted in a movie or television work appears,
the more personality the character must possess to acquire copyright protec-
tion."' A motion picture character stripped of the appearance and personality
of the actor performing the part more closely resembles a literary character
who can be analyzed and discussed only in terms of the character's behavioral
or personality characteristics. 215 As Bayard Berman and Joel Boxer have
stated, "'Rocky' without Sylvester Stallone or 'Julia' without Vanessa
Redgrave can only be defined and delineated as a literary character, that is,
only in terms of motivation, characterization, and relationship to the plot and
other characters."22 6 Therefore, an important measure of the protectability of
a motion picture character is the character's personality. The motion picture
character's personality may be ascertained from the character's dialogue and
actions within the movie.
Examine the motion picture character James Bond. The fictional character
James Bond is an international spy who has appeared in numerous movies.
Even though James Bond has been portrayed in the movies by numerous ac-
tors over the years, his personality has not changed. James Bond is a calm,
sophisticated, and intelligent secret agent for the British Government. He is
always involved in perilous situations while attempting to battle the evils of
enemy secret agents. James Bond is also a ladies' man and, in the course of his
adventures, he attracts beautiful women. The copyright in the character James
Bond does not lie in the physical appearance of James Bond, as portrayed by
any actor. Rather, the copyright in James Bond lies in the character's antics,
behavioral and personality, as depicted in the movie. Audiences, through
watching multiple movies, have come to recognize certain personality traits as
belonging to James Bond. His actions have also become somewhat predictable.
James Bond's unique personality would garner the character copyright
protection.2 7
That is not to say that physical appearance is irrelevant. Courts should ex-
amine a character's general physical characteristics in determining whether a
character is protected by copyright.228 The motion picture character's appear-
ance provides basic physical outlines of the character. The appearance pro-
vides a foundation for the character's copyright protection. However, in exam-
ining motion picture characters, the focus of a court's analysis should always
be on the uniqueness of the character's personality.
224. Berman & Boxer, supra note 102, at 330-31. See supra notes 192-96 for a discussion of
an actor's right to publicity.
225. Berman & Boxer, supra note 102, at 330-31.
226. Id. at 330.
227. See Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1160, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (recogniz-
ing that the character Rocky is protected by copyright).
228. See Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (examining Superman's
physical build and costume to determine the range of copyright protection afforded the character);
see also Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (finding the physical characteristics of the
character Rocky important in determining copyright protectability).
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Literary characters, on the other hand, derive their copyright protection al-
most exclusively from their distinctive personality. The court will thus protect
literary characters that are delineated in significant detail.2 29
The character Ebenezer Scrooge in A Christmas Carol is a good example of
a highly delineated character. Mr. Scrooge's stock characteristics-a grouchy
old man who does not like Christmas-do not afford him copyright protection.
But a reader of A Christmas Carol draws a mental picture of Mr. Scrooge's
physical appearance. Further, a reader discovers Ebenezer's traits of greed and
a cold-hearted dislike for Christmas. Scrooge's visits by three ghosts on Christ-
mas Eve change him into a warm-hearted, generous man. The stock elements
of greed, displeasure, or dislike for Christmas are not protectable in a charac-
ter. However, Ebenezer Scrooge becomes human through the words of the
story. He develops a personality distinctive to the Ebenezer Scrooge character.
The public relates the name Ebenezer Scrooge to the man who hated Christ-
mas. Scrooge's actions have become predictable. The overall perception of Eb-
enezer's character thus is that of a highly delineated character deserving the
shelter of copyright protection.
Therefore, in determining whether a literary character may be protected by
copyright, a court should first examine the physical description of the charac-
ter. Since rarely will a literary character be physically described in a novel,
the examination must proceed further with literary characters. The character's
attributes, traits, behavioral patterns, and predictability must be examined.
"The less developed the [character], the less [it] can be copyrighted."230 A
character's stock elements are not protectable.231 It is the character's physical
appearance and its highly delineated personality that comprise the protectable
features of a character. A character's physical depiction may alone be protect-
able or it may only be one of many factors which provide a fictional character
copyright protection. In any event, a character is protected by copyright apart
from its original work when the character's physical description, attributes,
traits, and actions are delineated in a manner such that the overall perception
of the character resembles that of a living human being.
282
229. See, e.g., Film Video Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (find-
ing that characters appearing in a novel were infringed by movie character); Burroughs v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding the Tarzan character was
highly delineated within the novel), afd, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
230. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Judge Learned
Hand's famous quote).
231. See, e.g., Olson v. NBC, 855 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding characters that
are lightly sketched are less likely to deserve protection); Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231,
243 (2d Cir. 1983) (looking at all of Superman's characteristics combined to determine pro-
tectability); Warner Bros. v. Film Ventures Int'l, 403 F. Supp. 522, 525 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (stating
that characters must be distinctly delineated); Fuld v. NBC, 390 F. Supp. 877, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (stating that simple characteristics are not copyrightable).




The setting of the original work in which a fictional character appears
should also be examined if, after examining the character's physical appear-
ance and personality traits, it is still unclear whether the character is entitled
to copyright protection. The setting of the original work may either limit or
expand the scope of copyright protection. When a character sits on the fence
of protection or lacks sufficient delineation of physicality or personality to war-
rant protection, it may still be afforded copyright protection. Under such cir-
cumstances, the court should examine the setting in which the character origi-
nally appears in order to enhance the specific character trait lacking sufficient
delineation. For example, a cowboy character originally appearing in a work
that is set in the Old West would include, as part of its personality, the char-
acteristics of that particular time period.
When the general appearance, demeanor, and antics of a character have
been portrayed in a different setting, the copyright in the original character
may still be infringed. 8  But if the appearance and behavior of the original
character and the alleged infringing character are somewhat similar, yet still
, possess different qualities, then the setting surrounding the character may be
used to determine the scope of copyright protection permitted. Examine the
literary character Scarlett O'Hara from the novel Gone with the Wind.2"" To
determine whether Scarlett O'Hara is sufficiently delineated to be afforded
copyright protection, courts would apply the test previously, discussed. Her
physical features must be examined. Since she is a literary character, her ap-
pearance is a relatively limited factor. Yet in the novel her physical features
are described in great detail. Hence, the character Scarlett O'Hara should
have limited copyright protection in her physical features. These physical fea-
tures set the foundation on which copyright protection is based. The rest of the
test must then be applied to the character.
The personality of Scarlett O'Hara generates the most protectable element
of the character. Throughout the development of the plot, Scarlett O'Hara
develops personality traits. The reader discovers these traits as if a personal
meeting took place. Scarlett O'Hara becomes human in the novel. Her person-
ality and actions become relatively predictable. Thus, to a limited extent,
Scarlett O'Hara's physical delineation should be protected by copyright, and
most definitely her personality and behavioral traits are protectable.
So thus far a character that resembles Scarlett O'Hara, who appears in a
233. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (noting that copyrights in Superman char-
acter would be infringed if his general appearance and behavioral traits were duplicated by a
character in a different setting); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding copyrights in numerous Disney characters infringed by use of exact reproductions of the
characters in a foreign drug culture), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
234. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936). The story Gone with the Wind was
set in the South during the Civil War. The novel examined the perils faced by plantation owners
during that period. In particular, the novel focused on the life of Scarlett O'Hara and the effect
that the loss of her plantation and the war had on her life.
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work staged during World War II, with the plot focusing on the hardship the
character faces due to the war, most likely would infringe the copyright in the
character Scarlett O'Hara, even though the setting differs. The original Scar-
lett O'Hara character is protectable. Even if the original Scarlett O'Hara
character lacked sufficient physical features or personality traits, the similarity
of the settings of the two stories may enhance the scope of the original Scarlett
O'Hara character's copyright protection.
Thus, the fact that a second work was set in the Civil War using a character
resembling Scarlett O'Hara, but differing slightly in appearance or personal-
ity, may enhance the scope of the protection granted the original Scarlett
O'Hara character to include the similar character of the second work. Like-
wise, a character used in a second work displaying the same general appear-
ance and personality traits as the original Scarlett O'Hara would, most likely,
be found to be encompassed within the realm of copyright protection offered
the original character, regardless of where the second story was set. And when
two settings differ significantly, the scope of copyright protection granted the
original character may be limited.
Thus, the setting in which a character is placed may work to increase (or in
some cases, decrease) the scope of the protection granted in the copyright.
D. The Proposed Test-A Restatement
A brief summary of the proposed test to determine the copyrightability of a
character may be helpful at this point. First, the proposal applies one test to
all characters-literary, graphic, and motion picture-seeking copyright pro-
tection. Therefore, the same test applies no matter what type of character is
being analyzed. Furthermore, the proposed test involves three basic steps. In
each step, a sliding scale evaluation is necessary, focusing on the level of de-
lineation of the character.
A court must first examine the physical delineation of a character seeking
protection. Any graphic depiction of a character will always warrant a limited
amount of copyright protection in the character's appearance itself, without
reference to any of the character's other traits. Thus, a graphic character
would be protected from any substantially similar reproduction of its likeness.
An extensive written description of a character may, likewise, warrant protec-
tion of the character's physical features. Such a situation, however, would
rarely exist. Most likely, a character's physical description will act only as a
foundation on which more extensive protection may be built.
The second step of the test requires a court to examine the personality of
the character. A character's personality becomes highly delineated when its
behavior becomes lifelike and somewhat predictable. Therefore, a character
lacking a sufficient physical description to warrant copyright protection may
still enter the realm of copyright protection if that character's personality is
extensively delineated by the author. Moreover, a character's personality traits
should be added to that character's physical description, thus enhancing the
scope of copyright protection granted the character.
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The third part of the test requires the court to examine the setting. This
part of the test becomes pertinent when a character stands at the border of the
area protected by copyright, but lacks sufficient characteristics to warrant
copyright protection. When a character borders on protectability, elements of
the setting may be incorporated into the character to push that character into
the area protected by the copyright laws. But the setting may also act to limit
the scope of protection afforded a borderline character.
The basic premise of the proposed test requires a court to determine the
overall "touch and feel" of the character. The more recognizable the charac-
ter, the more protection the character should be granted.
CONC USION
Too much is at stake commercially for the confusion and lack of clarity to
remain in determining whether a fictional character should be granted copy-
right protection apart from the work in which it originally appeared. Literary,
graphic, and motion picture characters all possess similar characteristics. The
characters all have certain elements of appearance as well as personality. The
substance of the character may be derived from elements in the public domain
and incorporated into the total mold of the character.2 8 But when the author
develops and defines his character, the character acquires an identity of its
own.2 86 The character becomes recognizable and distinct. At this point, the
author has a recognizable interest in the character. A well defined character
has a value-a value that may be taken and used by others. Only copyright
can adequately protect the author's rights in his character.
It is unnecessary for courts to apply both the old "story being told" and
"character delineation" tests because courts are uncertain as to which test is
proper. 1 7 It is a waste of judicial economy. The time is ripe for a change.
A unified test, analyzing each type of character under similar standards, is
offered to the courts. The test utilizes a sliding scale approach examining the
character's physical features and personality. Only well developed and highly
delineated characters acquire the refuge of copyright protection. The sliding
scale approach permits a character that lacks sufficient delineation in one as-
pect of its characterization to still be afforded copyright protection. The total
concept of the character must be analyzed. If the overall perception of the
character is highly delineated, the character is protectable by copyright.
Therefore, an author who does not adequately delineate his character cannot
seek the shelter granted by the copyright statute. That is the penalty an au-
thor must pay for making his character indistinct.2 88
235. Turner, supra note 12, at 353.
236. Id.
237. Anderson v. Stallone, II U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1160, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
238. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 10, § 2.12, at 2-171 to 2-178.2.
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